The energy efJciency requirement of wireless sensor networks (WSNs) is especially high because the sensor nodes are meant to operate without human intervention for a long period of time with little energy supply. Besides [14], that is, instead of relying on the computing power to double every I8 months, we are hound to seek ever cheaper solutions. However looking at the current development of WSNs (Table I) , computing power is indeed increasing, though not necessarily at the rate predicted by Moore's Law. Either way, we are conservative and assume that the hardware constraints of WSNs will remain rather constant for some time io come. Cryptographic algorithms are an essential part of the security architecture of WSNs, using the most efficient 'and sufficiently secure algorithm is thus an effective means of conserving resources. By 'efficient' in this paper we mean requiring little storage and consuming little energy. Although transmission consumes more energy than computation, our focus in this paper is on computation and we can only take transmission energy into account when considering the security scheme as a whole. 
Introduction
A wireless sensor network (WSN) is a network composed of a large number of sensors that (1) are physically small, (2) communicate wirelessly among each other, and ( 3 ) are deployed without prior knowledge of the network topology. Due to the limitation of their physical size, the sensors tend to have storage space, energy supply and communication bandwidth so limited that every possible means of reducing the usage of these resources is aggressively sought. For example, a sensor typically has 8-120KB of code memory and 5 12-4096 bytes of data memory. The energy supply of a sensor is such that it will he depleted in less than 3 days if operated constantly in active mode [18] . The transmission bandwidth ranges from IOkbps to 11Skbps. Table 1 compares the sensor node used in the EYES project (eyes .eu.org) with Smart Dust [I21 and the Intel Research mote [IS] .
Karlof and Wagner made an interesting observation that [14] , that is, instead of relying on the computing power to double every I8 months, we are hound to seek ever cheaper solutions. However looking at the current development of WSNs (Table I) , computing power is indeed increasing, though not necessarily at the rate predicted by Moore's Law.
Either way, we are conservative and assume that the hardware constraints of WSNs will remain rather constant for some time io come. Cryptographic algorithms are an essential part of the security architecture of WSNs, using the most efficient 'and sufficiently secure algorithm is thus an effective means of conserving resources. By 'efficient' in this paper we mean requiring little storage and consuming little energy. Although transmission consumes more energy than computation, our focus in this paper is on computation and we can only take transmission energy into account when considering the security scheme as a whole. The essential cryptographic primitives for WSNs are block ciphers, message authentication codes (MACs) and hash functions. Among these primitives, we are only concerned with block ciphers in this paper, because MACs can be constructed from block ciphers [25] , and hash functions are relatively cheap [6] .
Meanwhile, public-key algorithms are well-known to he prohibitively expensive [4] . Our selection of block ciphers is RC5 [26] , RC6 [27] to select the suitable ciphers based on the benchmark.
Section 2 explains bow we have arrived at our selection of block ciphers. Section 3 details aspects of our benchmarking. Section 4 provides our observation and evaluation results. Section 5 concludes.
The paper is organised as follows.
Selection Rationales
We have chosen our benchmark candidates based on the following rationales:
RC5 is a well-known algorithm that bas been around since 1995 without crippling weaknesses. Although distributed.net has managed to crack a @-bit RC5 key in RSA Laboratories Secret-Key Challenge after 1757 days of computing involving 58,747,597,657 distributed work units, the standard key length of RCS is 128 bits and RC5 has managed to withstand years o f cryptanalysis. Rijndael is the de facto Advanced Encryption Standard, mandated by the NIST of the United States, chosen after extensive scrutiny and performance evaluation (csrc .nist .gov/encryption/aes). It is also one of the ciphers recommended by the New European Schemes for Signature, Integrity and Encryption (NESSIE) Consortium (www.cryptonessie.org), and Japan's CRYP-TREC [7] . Rijndael is well studied and there are efficient implementations on a wide range of platforms (www. rijndael .coin). We would however like to obtain firsthand experience of evaluating Rijndael on our particular platform, which has never been studied before during the selection process of the AES.
RC6,
MISTYl is one of the CRYPTKEC-recommended 64-hit ciphers [7] and is the predecessor o f KASUMI, the 3GPP-endorsed encryption algorithm [l] . MISTY 1 is also a royalty-free open standard documented in RFC2994 [23] . We found MISTYl to be particularly suitable for 16-bit platforms.
KASUMI, as the 3GPP-endorsed encryption algorithm [I] , is presumably well-suited for embedded applications, and has gone through considerable expert scrutiny.
Camellia is one of the NESSIE-and CRYPTRECrecommended 128-hit ciphers [7] . Like MISTY I, Camellia is also royalty-free. Security-wise, Camellia has been designed with state-of-the-art modem techniques with a large safety margin in view of anticipated progress in cryptanalysis techniques [21 [20] . We are interested in seeing how it performs on our platform.
Methodology and Consideration
For benchmarking, we consider: (1) the cipher parameters, (2) the cipher operation modes, (3) the compiler toolchain, and (4) the implementation sources. Table 2 lists the parameters w e have adopted for each cipher (some of them actually have fixed, unadjustable parameters but we list them anyway for clarity's sake). The number of rounds for each cipher is nominal except for RCS, where 18 is used instead of the nominal 16, for security reasons described in our technical report [ 171. Although RC5 and KC6 allow variable word size, without the backing of relevant cryptanalytic research, we are not sure how many rounds to use if we pick a non-standard word size of 16 bits, which is the word size of our platform. Therefore, for RCS and RC6, we are using the standard word size of 32 bits. 
Cipher Parameters

Operation Modes
The naYve approach of encrypting a message longer than one block, by dividing the message into multiple blocks and encrypting the blocks separately, is called the electronic codebook mode (ECB) mode. ECB is insecure since an adversary can constmct valid ciphertexts from the original ciphertext by arbitrarily rearranging, repeating andor omitting blocks from the original ciphertext. More secure operation modes in Table 3 are used in practice. These operation modes do not only affect the security, but also the energy-efficiency of the encryption scheme. Their fault tolerance against ciphertext error (where Ciphertext bits are changed during transmission), and synchronisation error (where whole ciphertext blocks are lost) must also be taken into account. In our implementation of CBC, ciphertext stealing [28] is supported, so padding is not required. Meanwhile, some researchers [16] claim that CBC has an information leakage vulnerability due to the birthday paradox.
For CFB and OFB, we are using a feedback size that is equal to the block size.
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Implementation Sources
To avoid reinventing the wheel, we try to use and improve as much existing source code as possible. We briefly compare a few source code libraries that we are aware of in Table 4 . We have adapted most of our code from OpenSSL, and for the ciphers that do not have public implementation, we have adapted the reference source code from the original papers the ciphers are proposed in. Our sonrce code and benchmark results can be found at http: //wwwes. cs .
utwente.nl/eyes/crypto-test.zip.
Compilers
For compilation, we are currently only using IAR Systems' MSP430 C Compiler V2.2OAN32 (www.iar. com). For debugging and profiling, we use IAR Systems' Embedded Workbench 3.2 with the integrated C- nd Camellia).
e.g. M l S T Y l , KkSUMl Ofan
11) Su~wns most if not Gimilarto Crvoto++.
Spy Debugger and profiler plug-in. Another viable compiler is the GNU C compiler in the MSPGCC toolchain (mspgcc . sf .net), however we are not using it due to the lack of profiling support by the toolchain. That said, we do not rule out the possibility of performing our benchmarks using the toolchain as it continues to mature in the future. Note that the chip supplier itself Texas Instruments offers only the Kickstart version of the toolchain we are using.
In our benchmarks, we compare maximum size optimisation with maximum speed optimisation. The IAR compiler supports 3 levels of optimisation in terms of size or speed: High, Medium and Low, as well as 4 kinds of transformations: common subexpression elimination (ELIM), loop unrolling (UNROLL), function inlining (INLINE) and code motion (MOTION). Table 5 lists the levels of optimisation and kinds of transformations we use for each cipher. Furthermore, all code is compiled to use the hardware multiplier. In Table 5 
Memory
We refer to two types of memory: (I) code memory, in the form of Flash memory and (2) Of all the above segment sub-types, we use only the underlined ones. The memory usage of these segments can be read off the list files generated by the compiler, and the results are shown in Table 7 and 6. In Table 6 , notice that Rijndael has two figures for the data memory of skey: 16 is for encryption key setup, whereas 32 is for decryption key setup. Other ciphers use only one key setup algorithm for both encryption and decryption.
In Table 7 , the code memory for each CBC module takes into account (I) the code memory for key setup, (2) the code memory for barebone encryption and decryption, (3) the code memory for lookup tables, as well as (4) the code memory for CBC-specific parts. CFB, OFB and CTR do not use the decryption function 1281, hence the code memory for each CFBIOFBICTR module is similarly calculated except that the code memory for decryption, and decryption key setup in Rijndael's case, are not included. Note that the storage for plaintext, ciphertext, cipher key as well as expanded key is not included in Table 6 nor Table 7 . 
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CPU Cycles
The computational complexity of an algorithm translates directly to its energy consumption. Assuming the energy per CPU cycle is fixed (which is justified in the Appendix), then by measuring the number of CPU cycles executed per byte of plaintext processed, we get the amount of energy consumed per byte. For example MSP430F149 draws a nominal current of 420pA at 3V and at a clock frequency of lMHz in active mode 1301 -this means that the energy per instruction cycle (fur the pmcessor alone) is theoretically 1.26 nJ.
To evaluate the ciphers, we must determine the range of plaintext lengths that is of greatest interest to sensor networks. Here is how we amve at the choice of 4 to 64 bytes: first we would like to see the effect of half-blocks on the ciphers' performance since we expect the ciphers to he less efficient with partial blocks, so we start with the half-block length of the 64-bit ciphers (RC5, MISTY 1, KASUMI), that is 4 bytes. We then look at some MAC protocols like Sensor-MAC or S-MAC 1331. In S-MAC, the control packets are around IO bytes long, and the data packet header is 13 bytes. Meanwhile Pemg et al. 1241 suggest that data packets of 30 bytes long are realistic. Doubling this length (30 bytes) for the worst case scenario, we get 60 bytes, and rounding it off to a whole-block length, we get 64 bytes. Hence we think 4 to 64 bytes with an interval of 4 bytes is a reasonable range for our benchmarks. CBC decryption consumes a slightly different number of CPU cycles, but the relative ordering between the various ciphers remains the same. Of particular interest is that when size-optimised, MISTY1 is more efficient than when it is speed-optimised, and it actually outperforms size-optimised Rijndael when the plaintext is shorter than 8 bytes. At more than 8 bytes, Rijndael becomes more efficient, partly because in that case it takes fewer invocations of the Rijndael encryption function than it takes the MISTY 1 encryption function. Figure Ib shows that speed-optimised MISTY1 is more efficient than speed-optimised Camellia, for plaintext lengths of below 8 bytes, and between 20 and 24 bytes. case the increment of a counter. This approximation does not apply to CBC because with ciphertext stealing CBC involves more complicated computation. This approximation does not apply to RC5 and RC6 either because an RC5/RC6 enldecryption executes a different number of rotations depending on the data and the key, resulting in a non-constant value for CB. Thus for RC5 and RC6, the following equation is more appropriate:
where VB is a variable. Table 8 , it can be easily seen that OFB is the fastest mode hoth when size-and speed-optimised. Although not apparent in Figure 1 and Table 8 , CTR is more efficient than CBC as shown in Figure 2 using Rijndael as an example.
All,in all, the speed comparison is OFB > CTR > CFB > CBC when size-optimised, but OFB > CFB > CTR > CBC when speed-optimiskd. Observe also that size optimisation only speeds up CBC and CFB, but not OFB and CTR.
Apart from eddecryption, we are also interested in the efficiency of the key setup algorithms. Table 9 has the results. Note again that encryption key setup and decryption key setup consume different numbers of CPU cycles in Rijndael's case. 
Observation and Analysis
First about the operation mode. A p m from having the highest memory and energy efficiency, OFB has desirable fault-tolerance characteristics especially in an error-prone environment such as the wireless network, that is ( I ) an erroneous ciphertext bit affects only the corresponding bit of the decrypted plaintext block, (2) the decryption of a ciphertext block is independent of the previous block (cf Table 3 ).
However in the event that multiple blocks are lost, for example if i blocks cl. ..., c. are lost, the computing cost of the (i + 1)-th plaintext block using OFB is i + 1 encryptions of the initialisation vector, which is higher than the corresponding cost using CTR, involving just 1 increment and 1 encryption of the counter.
Next we analyse Figure 1 , Table 7, 6 and 8 cipher by   cipher: RC5: The speed-optimised version is 2 times as fast as the size-optimised version, at a price of 50% more code size and 3 times as much data size (which is 14% of the available RAM in an EYES node).
RC6: Nechvatal et al. [22] note that on the 280 processor, the key setup of RC6 is very time-consuming, and it takes about 4 times as many cycles as encryption (of one block) does. Our measurements reveal that key setup takes at least 5 times as many cycles as CBC encryption (the least efficient mode) does. For eddecryption, there is no significant difference between the size-optimised and the speedoptimised version in terms of memory and CPU cycles. Rijndael: Rijndael has a large S-box, eating up over l0KB of code memory, which is about the current sire of the EYES operating system [21] . Among our selection, Rijndael is the only cipher that has a separate key setup for decryption, and we note that this key setup is about 4 times as slow as that for encryption.
MISTY1: As mentioned, except for key setup, MISTY1
is actually more efficient when size-optimised than when speed-optimised. The size-optimised version also provides 17-19% savings in storage, with largely the same data memory requirement. MISTYl requires only 4 bytes of data memory for key setup.
KASUMI:
Like MISTY 1, the size-optimised version of KASUMI is more efficient than the speed-optimised version. Although the key setup of KASUMI is linear [9] , it takes more than 2 times as long as that of MISTY1 which is non-linear. Compared with MISTY 1, KASUMI uses more memory and is less efficient.
Camellia: Camellia has the largest code and data memory requirement, but with speed optimisation, Camellia is only worse than Rijndael in efficiency. This observation coincides with Granelli et al.'s conclusion that "Camellia is close to Rijndael" in performance [IO] .
To conclude our observations, we now discuss the rankings of the ciphers in Table IO . In terms of eddecryption, RC5 scores high on (meaning 'requires little') code memory and data memory while low on speed. While RC6 excels in small code size, it is the slowest even after speed optimisation. Speed-optimised Rijndael offers the highest speed but has a large code size.
Size-optimised MISTY1 is a solid performer in all categories, only worse than RCS, RC6 in code size, and Rijndael, Camellia in speed. KASUMI is always slightly behind MISTY l in all categories. Speed-optimised Camellia has decent performance but the largest code size and RAM footprint.
In terms of key setup, RCS tends to rank near the bottom except in the storage requirement of expanded keys. RC6 is only better than RCS in terms of data memory requirement. Rijndael requires little data memory but is slower tban MISTY1 and KASUMI. Rijndael also requires a lot of storage for expanded keys, hut in a degree not worse than Camellia. MISTY 1 is the winner, with KASUMI lagging slightly behind in all categories. Camellia requires a lot of data memory and storage for expanded keys, although it is better than RCS and RC6 in energy efficiency. Note that expanded keys can he stored in the code or data memory.
Conclusion
First on the suitable operation mode to use. Although OFB is the most storage-and energy-efficient mode, in cases where multiple blocks are lost, it is less efficient than CTR for regaining synchronisation. Although speedoptimised CFB is more efficient than CTR, it requires lost blocks to be re-transmitted. CBC not only requires lost blocks to he re-transmitted, but also requires a lot of code, data memory and CPU cycles. CBC is popular in the wired world because unlike other modes, the initialisation vector can be re-used. Our conclusion is that OFB should be used in static networks while CTR in dynamic networks, assum- US of the total code memory even after size optimisation, even though it has good energy-efficiency for eddecryption when speed-optimised. The next to be ruled out are RCS and RC6, which have poor energy efficiency and key agility (the ability to change keys quickly and with a minimum amount of resources). KASUMI lags behind MISTY 1 in all categories, so we should consider MISTY1 instead of KASUMI.
Finally the verdict: for maximum energy-efficiency, we recommend speed-optimised Rijndael; whereas for truly constrained environments, we recommend size-optimised MISTYI. Although MISTYl is slower than Rijndael in ddecryption, MISTY 1 has higher key agility and requires less memory (e.g. MISTYl's code size is 1/3 of Rijndael's). One other drawback apart from eddeclyption speed is that MISTY 1 is believed to be less secure than Rijndael and it only caters for one key length, but we foresee that there are applications that do not require a security level higher than MISTY 1 can provide, such as environmental sensing.
Reviewing some of the proposals in the literature so far, we see that we are disagreeing with Pemg et al. That is, using longer keys for higher security is a more appropriate approach. One non-technical reason against the use of RC6 is that the cipher is patented and not myaltyfree.
In conclusion, we have presented a detailed benchmark for one of the most important cryptographic primitives for WSNs, i.e. block ciphers. Taking into account the security properties, storage-and energy-efficiency of a set of candidates, we have anived at a systematically justifiable selection of block ciphers and operation modes.
Instead of measuring the current consumed by the processor alone, we have measured the current consumed by the entire EYES sensor node. This is acceptable because the measured instructions do not invoke functions on the peripheral circuits, and assuming the leakage current in the peripheral circuits stays constant independent of the measured instructions.
Results There are no entries in Table 11 for 'ret', 'p0p.b Rn' and 'p0p.w Rn'. Instead, ' r e t ' is measured along with 'call #L' or 'call Rn'; 'pop. b Rn' along with 'push. b Rn'; and 'pop. w R n ' along with 'push.w #C', 'push.w Rn' or 'push.w X(Rn)'. This is fair because in real-world applications, a pop is always associated with a push, so is a r e t associated with a c a l l .
The average current is 2.93mA, with a standard deviation of 0.05. From the table, we can see that the most energy-consuming instructions are 'mov. b @Rn+ , Rn' and 'xor . b @Rn+ , Rn', consuming a current of 3.03mA (when the program and the source data are loaded in the Flash), whereas ' b i s . w R n , Rn', 'mov . b Rn, Rn', 'rn0v.w Rn,Rn', the rotation instructions, 'swpb Rn' and 'sxt Rn' are the cheapest, consuming a current of 2.85mA (when everything is loaded in the RAM). While it is easy to appreciate why the latter instructions elicit the least current, it is interesting to leam that the instruction mode of '@RA+, Rn' draws a higher current than '@Rn+,X(Rn)' (although this does not mean that the '@RIP+, Rn' over 2 cycles, consumes more energy than '@RIP+, x (Rn) ' over 5 cycles).
All in all, the difference between the largest and the smallest current is only 6% of the mean, and we conclude that Z is more or less consistent, or in other words it is safe to assume that "energy per cycle" is more or less consistent for our particular hardware platform. 
